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Abstract
Recent results show that features of adversarially trained networks for classifica-
tion, in addition to being robust, enable desirable properties such as invertibility.
The latter property may seem counter-intuitive as it is widely accepted by the
community that classification models should only capture the minimal informa-
tion (features) required for the task. Motivated by this discrepancy, we investigate
the dual relationship between Adversarial Training and Information Theory. We
show that the Adversarial Training can improve linear transferability to new tasks,
from which arises a new trade-off between transferability of representations and
accuracy on the source task. We validate our results employing robust networks
trained on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet on several datasets. Moreover,
we show that Adversarial Training reduces Fisher information of representations
about the input and of the weights about the task, and we provide a theoretical
argument which explains the invertibility of deterministic networks without vio-
lating the principle of minimality. Finally, we leverage our theoretical insights to
remarkably improve the quality of reconstructed images through inversion.
1 Introduction
In the last 10 years, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) dramatically improved the performance in any
computer vision task. However, the impressive accuracy comes at the cost of poor robustness to
small perturbations, called adversarial perturbations, that lead the models to predict, with high
confidence, a wrong class [13, 30]. This undesirable behaviour led to a flourishing of research
works ensuring robustness against them. State-of-the-art approaches for robustness are provided by
Adversarial Training (AT) [22] and its variants [39]. The rationale of these approaches is to find
worst-case examples and feed them to the model during training train or constraining the output to
not change significantly under small perturbations. However, robustness is achieved at the expenses
of a decrease of accuracy: the more a model is robustness, the lower its accuracy will be [32]. This
is a classic “waterbed effect” between precision and robustness ubiquitous in optimal control and
many other fields. Interestingly, robustness is not the only desiderata of adversarially trained models:
their representations are semantically meaningful and they can be used for other CV tasks, such
as generation and (semantic) interpolation of images. More importantly, AT enables invertibility,
that is the ability to reconstruct input images from their representations [14] by solving a simple
optimization problem. This is true also for out-of-distribution images meaning that robust networks
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do not destroy information about the input. Hence, how can we explain that, while robust networks
preserve information, they lack in generalization power?
In this context, obtaining good representations for a task has been the subject of representation
learning where the most widely accepted theory is Information Bottleneck (IB) [31, 4, 2] which
calls for reducing information in the activations, arguing it is necessary for generalization. More
formally, let x be an input random variable and y be a target random variable, a good representation
z of the input should be maximally expressive about for y while being as concise as possible about
x. The solution of the optimal trade-off can be found by optimizing the Information Lagrangian:
min
z
−I(z, y) + βI(z, x)
where β controls how much information about x is conveyed by z. Both AT and IB at their core
aim at finding good representations: the first calls for representations that are robust to input pertur-
bations while the latter finds those minimal representations useful for the task. How are these two
methods related? Do they share some properties? More precisely, does the invertibility property
create a contraction on IB theory? In fact, if generalization requires discarding information in the
data that is not necessary for the task, it should not be possible to reconstruct the input images.
Throughout this paper we will (i) investigate the research questions stated above, with particular
focus on the connection between IB and AT and as a consequence of our analysis, (ii) we will reveal
new interesting properties of robust models.
1.1 Contributions and related works
A fundamental result of IB is that, in order to generalize well on a task, z has to be sufficient and
minimal, that is, it should contain only the information necessary to predict y, which in our case is
a target class. Apparently, this is in contradiction with the evidence that robust DNNs are invertible
maintaining almost all the information about the input x even if is not necessary for the task. How-
ever, what matters for generalization is not the information in the activations, but information in the
weights (PAC-Bayes bounds) [3]. Reducing information in the weights, yields to reduction in the
effective information in the activations at test time. Differently from IB theory, [3] claims that the
network does not need to destroy information in the data that is not needed for the task, it simply
needs to make it inaccessible to the classifier, but otherwise can leave it lingering in the weights.
That is the case for ordinary learning. This paper shows that, while AT preserves information about
the data that is irrelevant for the task in the weights (to the point where the resulting model is invert-
ible), the information that is effectively used by the classifier does not contain all the details about the
input x. In other words, the network is not effectively invertible: what really matters is the accessible
information stored in the weights. In order to visualize this fact, we will introduce effective images,
that are images that represent what the classifiers ”sees”. Inverting learned representations is not
new, and it was solved in [23, 37, 33, 16]; however, these methods either inject external information
through priors or explicitly impose the task of reconstruction contrary to robust models.
The main contribution of this work can be summarized as follows. If representations contain all the
information about the input x, then adversarially trained models should be better at transfering fea-
tures to different tasks, where aspects of the data that were irrelevant to the task it was (pre)-trained
on were neither destroyed nor ignored, but preserved. To test this hypothesis, we perform linear
classification (fine-tune the last layer) for different tasks. We show that AT improves linear transfer-
ability of deep learning models across diverse tasks which are sufficiently different from the source
task/dataset. Specifically, the farther two tasks are (as measured by a task distance), the higher the
performance improvement that can be achieved by training a linear classifier using an adversarially-
trained model (feature, or backbone) compared to an ordinarily trained model. Related to this,
in [28] the transferability of robustness to new tasks is studied experimentally; differently, in the
present work we study the linear transferability of natural accuracy. Moreover, we also analytically
show that, confirming empirical evidence [14], once we extract robust features from a backbone
model, all the models using these features have to be robust.
We will also show that adversarial regularization is a lower-bound of the regularizer in the Informa-
tion Lagrangian, so AT in general results in a loss of accuracy for the task at hand. The benefit is
increased transferability, thus showing a classical tradeoff of robustness (and its consequent transfer-
ability) and accuracy on the task for which it is trained. This is a classic “waterbed effect” between
precision and robustness ubuiquitous in optimal control.
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Regarding the connection with IB, we show analytically that AT reduces the effective information
in the activations about the input, as defined by [3] ( Section 5). Moreover, we show empirically that
adversarial training also reduces information in the weights and its consequences.
Finally, we show that injecting effective noise once during the inversion process dramatically im-
proves reconstruction of images in term of convergence and fit quality.
2 Preliminaries and Notation
We introduce here the notation used in this paper. We denote a dataset of N samples with D =
{(xi, yi)}Ni=1 where x ∈ X is an input, and y ∈ Y is the target class in the finite set Y = {1, . . . ,K}.
More in general, we refer to y as a random variable defining the ”task”. In this paper we focus on
classification problems using cross-entropy LD(w) = E(x,y)∼D[`(x, y;w)] on the training set D as
objective where `(x, y;w) = − log pw(y|x) and pw(y|x) is encoded by a DNN. The loss LD(w) is
usually minimized using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [6], which updates the weights w with
a noisy estimate of the gradient computed from a mini-batch of samples. Thus, weights update can
be expressed by a stochastic diffusion processes with non-isotropic noise [20]. In order to measure
the (asymmetric) similarity between distributions we use the Kullbach-Liebler divergence between
p(x) and q(x) given by KL( p(x) ‖ q(x) ) = Ex∼p(x)
[
log(p(x)/q(x))
]
. It is well-known that the
second order approximation of the KL-divergence is Ex KL( pw(y|x) ‖ pw+δw(y|x) ) = δwtFδw+
o(‖δw‖2) where F is the Fisher Information Matrix (simply referred to as “Fisher”), defined by
F = Ex,y∼p(x)pw(y|x)[∇ log pw(y|x)∇ log pw(y|x)t] = Ex∼p(x)pw(y|x)[−∇2w log pw(y|x)]. The
FIM gives a local measure of how much a perturbation δw on parameters w, will change pw(y|x)
with respect to KL divergence [25]. Finally, let x and z be two random variables. The Shannon
mutual information is defined as I(x; z) = Ex∼p(x)[KL( p(z|x) ‖ p(z) )]. Throughout this paper,
we indicate the representations before the linear layer as z = fw(x), where fw(x) is called feature
extractor.
Adversarial Training AT aims at solving the following min-max problem:
min
w
E(x,y)∼D[`(x?, y;w)], x? = argmax
‖δ‖2<ε
`(x+ δ, y;w) (1)
In the following we denote E(x,y)∼D[`(x?, y;w)] with L?D(w). We remark that by E(x,y)∼D we
mean the empirical expectation over N elements of the dataset. Intuitively, the objective of AT is to
ensure stability to small perturbations on the input. With cross-entropy loss this amounts to require
that KL( pw(x+ δ) ‖ pw(x) ) ≤ γ, with γ small. Depending on ε, we can write Equation (1) as:
min
w
E(x,y)∼D[`(x, y;w)] + β max‖δ‖2≤ε
KL( pw(y|x+ δ) ‖ pw(y|x) ) (2)
which is the formulation introduced in [39] when using cross-entropy loss.
3 Does invertibility contradict Information Bottleneck?
As shown by [10], robust representations are (almost) invertible, also for out-of-distribution data.
Before continuing we define the (weak) inversion:
Definition 3.1 (Inversion). Let z¯ = fw(x) be the final representation (before linear classifier) of
an image x, and let fw be the robust feature extractor. The reconstructed image (inversion) is the
solution of the following problem:
xˆ(x; z) = f−1(zˆ) = argmin
x′
Linv(x
′, z¯), Linv(x′, z¯) = ‖z¯ − f(x′)‖2 (3)
where the initial condition of x′ is white noise x′(0) ∼ N(0.5, σ), where σ is the noise scale1.
Figure 6 shows examples of inversions using Equation (3) (second row of images): the effectiveness
in invertibilty is apparent, which is odd considering that a classifier should store only information
useful for the task. This is surprising as robust features should discard useful details more than
1In the actual implementation images are clamped to [0, 1].
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standard models. In fact, let x and z be two random variables, z = f(x) where f is such that
there exists a (implicit) map g such that g ◦ f = Id, where Id is the identity map. Then, we
have: I(x, z) = ∞. In other words, when f is an invertible map, the Shannon information is
infinite. This fact seems to be contradicting the results reported in literature in the past recent
years; how can invertibility and minimality of representations be conciliated? Where is the excess
of information which explains the gap? If you had a powerful enough decoder, you could possibly
perfectly reconstruct the original image from any layer of any network. The important fact is that
invertibility of robust models empirically prove that is it not necessary to remove information about
the input to generalize well [5]. This main problem of standard IB, is that it requires to operate in the
activactions during training and there is no guarantee that information is also reduced at test time,
which is not as AT shows. In support of this, [3] shows that it is still possible to maintain information
about input at test time while make the information inaccessible for the classifier. In Section 5 we
will expand such argument.
4 Robust models: transferability-accuracy trade off?
The insights from the previous section motivates the following argument: if in robust models infor-
mation is still there, is it possible that features not useful for the original task y1 are useful for other
tasks? In a sense, z is a well-organized semantic compression of x such that it approximately allows
to linearly solve the new task y2|z. How well the task y2 is solved depends on how z is organized.
In fact, even though z is optimal for y1 and for reconstructing x, it still could be not optimal for y2.
This intuition suggests that having robust features z is more beneficial then having a standard model
when the distance d(y2, y1) between tasks y2 and y1 is such that features from the source models
are not easily adaptable to the new task. Thus, there may exist a trade-off between accuracy on a
given task and stability to distributions changes: ”locally” standard models work better as feature
extractor, but globally this may not be true; in the Appendix we provide a theoretical explanation for
this claim. In order to test our hypothesis, we fist analyze the structure of representations extracted
from adversarially-trained models and then we experimentally analyze how robust features linearly
transfer with respect standard features.
Structure of representations Recently, [12] showed that more entangled features, that is more
class-independent, allow for better generalization and robustness. In order to understand the effect
of AT, in Figure 1 we show the t-SNE [21] embedding of final representations for different values of
ε: as ε increases, the entanglement increases at the expenses of less discriminative features. Thus,
robust models capture more high-level features instead of the ones useful only for the task at hand.
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Figure 1: t-SNE of features extracted from a batch of 512 images with a robust ResNet-18 model
trained on CIFAR-10 for different values of ε. The color code follows the different classes. As ε
increases, features become less discriminative.
4.1 Transferability experiments
In our experiments we employ CIFAR-10 [18], CIFAR-100 [18] and ImageNet [9] as source
datasets. All the experiments are obtained with ResNet-50 and ε = 1 for CIFAR and ε = 3 for
ImageNet as described in [14] and in the Appendix.
In Table 1 we show performance of fine-tuning for the networks pretrained on CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 transfering to CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 F-MNIST [36], MNIST [19] and SVHN [26].
Details of target datasets are given in Appendix. Results confirm our hypotheses: when a task is ”vi-
sually” distant from the source dataset, the robust model performs better. For example, CIFAR-10
images are remarkably different from the SVHN or MNIST ones. Moreover, as we should expect,
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the accuracy gap (and thus the distance) is not symmetric: while CIFAR-100 is a good proxy for
CIFAR-10, the opposite is not true. In fact, when fine-tuning on a more complex, from a robust
model is possible to leverages features that the standard model would discard. According to [7], we
employ Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) as a proxy of dataset distance, and we extract the order be-
tween datasets. As we show in Figure 2, the distance correlates well with the accuracy gap between
robust and standard across all the tasks.
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Figure 2: Accuracy gap between the
robust and standard model transfering
from CIFAR-100.
Table 2 shows similar results using models pretrained on
ImageNet. The robust model provides better performance
in all the benchmarks being them quite different from the
original tasks. We also report experiments on more diffi-
cult datasets namely Aircraft [24], Birds [35], Cars [17],
Dogs [15]2, Flowers [27], Indoor [29] that would have
not been suitable for transfering from simpler tasks like
CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Not surprisingly the robust
model shows lower accuracy compared to the standard
one since images are very similar to those contained in
the ImageNet dataset. For examples, Dogs images are se-
lected from ImageNet.
Also with ImageNet, as shown by Figure 3, the difference
in accuracy between the two model is correlated with dis-
tance. We can see that the closer the task the higher the
difference in accuracy in favor of the standard model. For the sake of space, we report similar re-
sults for other source and target datasets in the Appendix. This experiments show that, when we
know that the target dataset is sufficiently dissimilar from the source task, it is more advantageous
fine-tuning adversarially-trained models.
C-10
C-100 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
Rob 44.92 76.89 88.11 58.34
St 35.76 67.15 64.17 36.6
C-100
C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
74.47 84.85 94.96 70.61
80.18 76.10 79.46 55.6
Table 1: Transfer accuracy [%] starting from CIFAR-10 (left) and CIFAR-100 (right).
IMG C-10 C-100 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN Aircraft Birds Cars Dogs Flowers Indoor
Rob 93.78 77.94 90.09 98.03 76.90 33.81 35.91 40.47 66.25 93.15 63.06
St 84.72 64.48 86.38 93.91 50.46 36.72 53.58 50.12 88.39 95.48 72.84
Table 2: Transfer accuracy [%] of a ResNet50 pretrained on ImageNet.
2The Stanford Dogs dataset contains images of 120 breeds of dogs. This dataset has been built using images
and annotation from ImageNet.
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Robustness of fine-tuned models Are the fine-tuned models still robust? As already experimen-
tally shown by [14, 28], an advantage of using fw(·) as a feature extraction is that then the new
model A2fw(·) + b2 is robust for the new task. Indeed, it is sufficient to show that the Fisher Fy|x
is bounded from above by Fz|x, that is, the linear classifier can only reduce information. Of course,
this is true only when fine-tuning only the linear classifier.
Lemma 4.1. Let z = fw be the feature extractor, y = Az + b, with A ∈ Rk×p, where k < p. Let
Fz|x be the Fisher of its activations about the input. Then, it holds: trFy|x ≤ trFz|x.
5 Adversarial training reduces information
In this section, we analytically show why, even if the robust network is invertible at test time, it
is effectively not invertible as a consequence of noise injected by SGD. This also explains why
generalization power can be reduced. We first define the Fisher Fz|x of representations w.r.t. inputs.
Definition 5.1. The FIM Fz|x of representations w.r.t the input distribution is defined as:
Fz|x = Ex∼pw(x)Ez∼pw(z|x)∇x log pw(z|x)∇x log pw(z|x)t = Ex∼pw(x)S(z|x) (4)
where S(z|x) is the sensitivity matrix of the model at a fixed input location x.
In the next proposition we relate AT to Equation (4), showing that requiring the stability of fw w.r.t.
x is equivalent to regularize the FIM Fz|x.
Proposition 5.2. Let δ ∈ X be a small perturbation such that ‖δ‖2 = ε.3 Then,
max
‖δ‖2
KL( pw(z|x+ δ) ‖ pw(z|x) ) ≈ ε
2
2
vtλ1S(z|x)vλ1 (5)
where λ1 is the (unit-norm) eigen-vector corresponding to the first principal eigenvalue.
Hence, AT is equivalent to regularize the Fisher of representation z with respect to inputs
x. Applying white Gaussian noise instead of adversarial noise Equation (5) would become
KL( pw(z|x+ δ) ‖ pw(z|x) ) ≈ ε
2
2n
trS(z|x), where n is the input dimension. It is easy to see that
trS(z|x)
n
≤ vtλ1S(z|x)vλ1 , meaning that Gaussian Noise Regularization (GNR) is upped bounded
by AT: the inefficiency of GNR increases as the input dimension increases, causing that many di-
rections preserve high curvature. [32] showed that AT, for a linear classification problem with hinge
loss, is equivalent to penalize the `2-norm of weights. The next, examples show that when using
cross-entropy loss, penalizing the Fisher Fz|x yields a similar results.
Example 5.3 (Binary classification). Assume a binary classification problem where y ∈ {−1, 1}
Let p(y = 1|x) = 1− p(y = −1|x) = sigmoid(wtx). Then we have:
Fz|x = cwwt and tr(Fz|x) = c ‖w‖22 , c = Ex[p(y = −1|x)p(y = 1|x)]
Previous examples may suggest that with `2 perturbations AT may reduce the l2-norm of the weights.
We trained robust models with different ε (with the same seed) to verify this claim. We discovered
that it is true only for ε > 1, pointing out that there exist (roughly) two different regimes.
What we are interested in is the relation between the Shannon Mutual Information I(z, x) and the
Fisher Information in the activations Fz|x. However, in adversarial training there is nothing that
is stochastic but SGD. In order to deal the problem of dealing with deterministic networks, [3]
introduced effective information. The idea under this definition is that, even though the network is
deterministic at the end of training, what matters is the noise that SGD inject to the classifier. Thus,
the effective information is a measure of the information that the network effectively uses in order
to classify. Before continuing, we need to quantify this noise applied to weights.
Definition 5.4 (Information in the Weight). The complexity of the task D at level β, using the
posterior Q(w|D) and the prior P (w), is
Cβ(D;P,Q) = Ew∼Q(w|D)[LD(pw(y|x))] + βKL(Q(w|D) ‖P (w) )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information in the Weights
, (6)
3We would like to note that the practical implementation only requires ‖δ‖2 ≤ ε. However, in practice, it
is possible to see that for small ε, the norm of δ is almost always ε.
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where Ew∼Q(w|D)[LD(pw(y|x))] is the (expected) reconstruction error of the label under the
“noisy” weight distribution Q(w|D); KL(Q(w|D) ‖P (w) ) measures the entropy of Q(w|D)
relative to the prior P (w). If Q∗(w|D) minimizes Equation (6) for a given β, we call
KL(Q∗(w|D) ‖P (w) ) the Information in the Weights for the task D at level β.
Given β, the solution of the optimal trade-off is given by the distributionQ(w|D) ∼ N(w?,Σ?) such
that Σ? =
β
2
(
Fw +
β
2λ2
I
)−1
. The previous definition tells us that if we perturb uninformative
weights, the loss is only slightly perturbed. This means that information in the activations that is not
preserved by such perturbations is not used by the classifier.
Definition 5.5. (Effective Information in the Activations [3]). Let w be the weights, and let n ∼
N(0,Σ∗w), with Σ
∗
w = βF
−1(w) be the optimal Gaussian noise minimizing Equation (6) at level
β for a uniform prior N(0, λ2I). We call effective information (at noise level β) the amount of
information about x that is not destroyed by the added noise:
Ieff,β(x; z) = I(x; zn), (7)
where zn = fw+n(x) are the activations computed by the perturbed weights w + n ∼ N(w,Σ∗w).
By Prop 4.2(i) in [3] we have that the relation between Fz|x and effective information is given by:
Ieff,β(x; z) ≈ H(x)− Ex
[1
2
log
( (2pie)k
|Fz|x|
)]
, (8)
where H(x) is the entropy of input distribution. Equation (8) shows that AT compresses data sim-
ilarly to IB. With AT, the noise in injected in the input x and not only in the weights. In order to
reduce the effective information that the representations have about the input (relative to the task), it
is sufficient to decrease |Fz|x|, that is, increasing ε. In the Supplementary Material, we show how
details about x are discarded varying ε.
A benefit of robust networks is that it is possible to visualize the images that are effectively ”seen”
by the classifier. This, together with Definition 5.5, suggest the following definition.
Definition 5.6 (Effective image). Let z¯ = fw(x), and let fw be the model trained with ‖δ‖2 ≤ ε.
We define effective image xeff,ε at level ε, the solution of the following problem:
xeff,ε(x; z) = argmin
x′
‖fw+n(x)− f(x′)‖2 (9)
where n ∼ N(w,Σ?) and Σ? = βF−1(w).
The idea of under effective images is to simulate the training conditions by artificially injecting
the noise that approximate SGD. In this manner we can visualize how AT controls the information
conveyed by the images. In Figure 6 we show some examples. Interestingly, robust features are not
always good features: in fact, due to the poor diversity of the dataset (CIFAR-10), the feature color
green is highly correlated with class frog.
AT reduces the information in the weights We showed that AT reduces effective information
about x in the activation. However, [3] showed that to have guarantees about generalization and in-
variance to nuisances at test time one has to control the trade off between sufficiency for the task and
information the weights have about the dataset. A natural question to ask is whether reducing infor-
mation in the activations implies reducing information in the weights, that is the mutual information
βI(w;D) between the weights and the dataset. The connection between weights and activation is
given by the following formula:
Fz|x =
1
β
∇xfw · JfFwJ tf ∇xfw (10)
Decreasing the Fisher Information that the weights contain about the training set decreases the ef-
fective information between inputs and activations. However, the vice-versa may not be true in
general. In fact, it is sufficient that ‖∇xfw‖ decreases. Indeed, this fact was used in several works
to enhance model robustness [34, 11]. However, as we show in Figure 4, AT reduces information in
the features as the embedding defined by |F−1w |, that is, the log-variance of parameters is increased
when increasing the ε applied on training. Experiments are done with a ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10.
Interestingly, this provides the evidence that it is possible to achieve robustness without reducing
‖∇xfw‖.
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Adding effective noise (once) improves inversion The quality of inversion depends on the ca-
pability of gradient flow to reach the target representation zˆ. Starting from regions that are distant
to training and test points fw may be less smooth. Intuitively, especially during the first phase of
optimization, it can be beneficial to inject noise to escape from local minima. Surprisingly, we dis-
cover that by injecting effective noise once, reconstruction is much faster and the quality of images
improve dramatically. More practically, at the beginning of optimization, we perturb weights with
n¯ ∼ N(0,Σ?) and solve the inversion with fw+n¯. By visually comparing row 2 and 3 of Figure 6,
it is easy to see that injecting noise as described above, improves the quality of reconstruction.
Figure 6: Inversion using the standard and variational ResNet-50 model. (Top row) Original images.
(Second row) Images reconstructed optimizing Equation (3). (Third row) Images reconstructed as
described in Section 5. (Bottom row) Effective images obtained optimizing Equation (9).
In support of this, in Figure 7 we numerically assess the quality of representations using the loss
Linv(x, z). The variational model, beside improving quality of fit, also allow fast convergence:
converge is achieved after roughly 200 iterations while the deterministic model converges after 8k
iterations (∼ 40×).
6 Conclusions
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Existing works about robust models [22, 14, 32] showed
that there exists a trade-off between robustness of repre-
sentations and accuracy for the task. This paper extend
this property showing the parameters of robust models
are the solution of a trade-off between usability of fea-
tures for other tasks and accuracy for the source task.
By leveraging results in [3, 1], we show that AT has a
compression effect similarly to IB, and we explain our
a network can be invertible and still loses accuracy for
the task. Moreover, we show that AT also reduces infor-
mation in the weights, extending the notion of effective
information from perturbations of the weights, to pertur-
bations of the input.
We also show that effective noise can be also useful to improve reconstruction of images both in
terms of convergence and quality of reconstruction.
Finally, we provided an analytic argument which explains why robust models can be better at trans-
fering features to other tasks. As a corollary of our analysis, to train a generic feature extractor for
several tasks, it is best to train adversarially, unless one already knows the specific task for which
the feature is going to be used.
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Broader Impact
The impact of this work resides on the efficiency of adapting existing models to new tasks where a
small or insufficient number of training examples are given. In fact, real-world applications, where
data are much scarser than those typically employed in benchmark comparisons, can benefit from
our approach. The limitation of this work is that it does not provide with criteria to decide whether
to use a standard or a robust model as source: this choice is left to users to decide what approach to
prefer depending on the application at hand.
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A Proofs of propositions
In the following we prove Lemma 4.1.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 4.1 The intuition under this lemma is very similar to Data Processing In-
equality (DPI). If we have X → Z → Y and Z is robust, the map Y → Z can only use robust
information. As shown, for example, in [38] [Theorem 13], the DPI also holds for the Fisher Infor-
mation.
Although the previous lemma is very simple, it has remarkable consequences: as soon as one is able
to extract robust features, at some level of the ”chain”, then all the information extracted from these
features is robust. For example, [14] shows that by training on images that are obtained by robust
models, leads to a robust model, without applying AT. In this case, the robust features are directly
the images.
B Experimental setting
To quantitatively evaluate the improved transferability provided by robust models we perform exper-
iments on common benchmarks for object recognition. More in details, we fine tune three networks
pretrained on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100.
We used the pretrained robust ResNet-50 models on CIFAR-10 (with ε = 1 and ImageNet (with
ε = 3) from [14] We used the pretrained ResNet-50 models and Imagenet ). Similarly, we trained
on CIFAR-100 with 8 steps of PGD iterations with ε = 1.
We fine-tune with different modalities: 0) both the linear classifier and the batch norm before it, 1)
both the linear classifier and the batch norm of the entire network, 2) the entire network. We then
compare the top1 accuracy on the test set of the different models. We asses the performance on the
tranferability using a Resnet50. For CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100 fine tuning is done for 120 epochs
using SGD with batch size 128, learning rate that starts from 1e-2 and drops to 1e-3, 1e-4 at epochs
50 and 80 respectively. We use weight decay 5e-4. For Imagenet fine tuning is done for 300 epochs
with batch size equal to 256, the same learning rate decay at epochs 150 and 250 respectively and
weight decay 1e-4. We use momentum acceleration with parameter 0.9 for all datasets.
In table 3 we report the description of the datasets used in this paper.
Dataset Task Category Classes Training size Test size
Imagenet [9] general object detection 1000 1281167 50000
CIFAR-10 [18] general object detection 10 50000 10000
CIFAR-100 [18] general object detectio 100 50000 10000
MNIST [19] handwritten digit recognition 10 60000 10000
F-MNIST [36] clothes classification 10 60000 10000
SVHN [26] civic number classification 10 73257 26032
Oxford Flowers [27] fine-grained object recognition 102 2,040 6,149
CUB-Birds 200-2011 [35] fine-grained object recognition 200 5,994 5,794
FGVC Aircrafts [24] fine-grained object recognition 100 6,667 3,333
Stanford Cars [17] fine-grained object recognition 196 8,144 8,041
Stanford Dogs [15] fine-grained object recognition 120 12,000 8,580
MIT Indoor-67 [29] scene classification 67 5,360 1,340
Table 3: Datasets employed in this paper.
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C Image reconstruction
C.1 Algorithms
Algorithm 1 shows the procedure to compute effective images (see Definition 5.6), while Algo-
rithm 2 represents the procedure to compute the variational inversion where noise in sample once
(see Section 5).
Algorithm 1 ”Variational” Inversion. Injecting noise once before the optimization, improves the
image reconstruction.
Input: Image x, representation z¯ = fw(x), noise matrix Σ? = βF−1(w), number of steps N ,
learning rate η.
Initialize r0 ∼ N(0.5, σ)
Sample n¯ ∼ N(0,Σ?)
for each iteration k < N do
Reconstruct the image at step k through SGD on input input space:
rk+1 = rk − η∇x ‖fw+n¯(rk)− z¯‖2
end for
Return xˆ = rN
Algorithm 2 Effective images. Inversion only capture statistics effectively used during training by
the model.
Input: Image x, representation z¯ = fw(x), noise matrix Σ? = βF−1(w), number of steps N ,
learning rate η.
Initialize r0 ∼ N(0.5, σ)
for each iteration k < N do
1. Sample n ∼ N(0,Σ?)
2. Reconstruct the image at step k through SGD on input input space:
rk+1 = rk − η∇x ‖fw+n(rk)− z¯‖2
end for
Return xˆ = rN
C.2 Effect of ε on the inversion
In Figure 8 it is shown the effect of training with different values of ε on the image reconstruction.
D Effective transferable information
We provide an theoretical intuition about transferability of robust models.
Since AT reduces Fw|D, it reduces the information that the network has about the dataset D. In fact:
I(w;D) ≈ H(w)− ED
[1
2
log
( (2pie)k
|Fw|D|
)]
, Fw|D ≈ ∇DwtFw∇Dw (11)
From the previous proposition we can see that there are two ways of reducing the information
I(w;D). The first is reducing |Fw| and the other is making the weights w more stable with re-
spect to perturbation of the datasets. For example, the latter can be accomplished by choosing a
suitable optimization algorithm or a particular architecture. Reducing the Fisher Fw|D, implies that
the representations vary less when perturbing the dataset with δD. This explains that fact that AT
is more robust to distribution shifts. We would like to remark again that there are two ways for
transfering better: one is to reduce ‖∇Dw‖2 and the other one is reducing |Fw|.
Finally, the previous argument does not imply that robust training is better at transfering but that is
more stable, making more likely that robust models are better when target tasks are distant from the
source task.
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Figure 8: Inversion of a ResNet-18 robust model with several values of ε. As we can see, there is an
optimal value of ε? for the reconstruction task. When ε > ε? details start to be removed. Instead,
when ε < ε?, the network is not regular enough to make the inversion feasible.
E Omitted tables and figures
We test the trivial hypothesis that standard models are better at transfering features when the source
and target distributions are nearly the same: we choose CIFAR-10 as source dataset and CINIC-
10 [8] as target dataset removing the images in common with CIFAR-10. The remaining images are
extracted from ImageNet. We call this dataset CINIC-IMAGENET. As [8] shows, the pixel statistics
are very similar, and in fact the standard models performs better at linear transfer:
St Rob
84 80
Table 4: ResNet-50 with CIFAR-10 as source dataset and CINIC-IMAGENET as target dataset.
Accuracy in percentage after fine-tuning of linear layer.
CIFAR-100 SVHN F-MNIST MNIST
10.0
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
22.5
a r
ob
a s
t
Figure 9: Accuracy gap between the robust and standard model transfering from CIFAR-10.
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F Transfer with all modes
While our aim is to show that robust models have better linear transferability than standard ones, we
report here results also for fine tuning in modalities 1 and 2 (Tables 5 to 9 and Figures 10 to 14). Of
course, the performance gap in these cases is reduced compared to mode 0 (see Tables 7 to 9) being
the network able to change more to adapt to the new task. Interestingly, we notice a substantial
impact of the batch norm layers on the classification performance: mode 1 provides a significant
boost in classification accuracy compared to mode 0 particularly when the network is pretrained on
simple datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100), even though the parameters of feature extractor are still
kept fixed and only the batch norm in the entire network is fine tuned.
C-10
C-100 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
0 Rob 44.92 76.89 88.11 58.34
St 35.76 67.15 64.17 36.67
1 Rob 61.92 88.78 98.25 91.52
St 58.76 86.65 98.04 90.88
2 Rob 78.85 93.22 99.24 96.51
St 78.34 92.15 99.23 96.62
C-100
C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
74.47 84.85 94.96 70.61
80.18 76.10 79.46 55.60
85.67 89.22 98.33 91.34
87.80 88.65 97.75 91.12
94.82 92.58 99.24 96.63
95.20 91.78 99.22 96.60
Table 5: Transferability of a ResNet50 pretrained on CIFAR-10 (right) and CIFAR-100 (left) in
terms of percentage accuracy.
IMG C-10 C-100 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN Aircraft Birds Cars Dogs Flowers Indoor
0 Rob 93.78 77.94 90.09 98.03 76.90 33.81 35.91 40.47 66.25 93.15 63.06
St 84.72 64.48 86.38 93.91 50.46 36.72 53.58 50.12 88.39 95.48 72.84
1 Rob 94.04 79.01 92.53 98.59 92.24 37.89 28.98 57.82 65.96 94.62 63.73
St 91.47 75.13 92.63 98.44 91.30 37.83 24.04 64.20 78.73 96.21 67.24
2 Rob 97.99 87.31 95.51 99.47 96.89 67.15 51.53 87.51 76.22 98.90 72.09
St 97.10 85.54 95.21 99.35 96.47 71.32 64.33 89.38 83.34 99.27 76.87
Table 6: Transferability of a ResNet50 pretrained on ImageNet in terms of percentage accuracy.
C-10
C-100 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
0 9.16 9.74 23.94 21.68
1 3.16 2.13 0.21 0.65
2 0.51 1.07 0.01 -0.10
C-100
C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
-5.71 8.75 15.50 15.00
-2.12 0.57 0.58 0.22
-0.11 0.80 0.02 0.03
Table 7: Accuracy % difference between the robust and standard model tranfering from CIFAR-10
(left) and CIFAR-100 (right).
F.1 Architecture impact
We report here a comparison of transfering performance using two different architectures namely
ResNet50 and ResNet18, trained on CIFAR-100, to assess the impact of the network capacity. It is
noticeable that with the more complex network (ResNet50) the gap is reduced in cases where the
standard model is better and it is increased in cases where the robust one is better.
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IMG C-10 C-100 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
0 9.06 13.46 3.71 4.12 26.44
1 2.57 3.88 -0.10 0.15 0.94
2 0.89 1.77 0.30 0.12 0.42
Table 8: Accuracy % difference between the robust and standard model tranfering from ImageNet.
IMG Aircraft Birds Cars Dogs Flowers Indoor
0 -2.91 -17.67 -9.65 -22.14 -2.32 -9.78
1 0.06 4.95 -6.38 -12.77 -1.59 -3.51
2 -4.17 -12.79 -1.87 -7.12 -0.37 -4.78
Table 9: Accuracy % difference between the robust and standard model tranfering from ImageNet
on fine grained datasets.
ResNet50
C-100 C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
0 Rob 74.47 84.85 94.96 70.61
St 80.18 76.10 79.46 55.60
1 Rob 85.67 89.22 98.33 91.34
St 87.80 88.65 97.75 91.12
2 Rob 94.82 92.58 99.24 96.63
St 95.20 91.78 99.22 96.60
ResNet18
C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
68.89 83.40 94.61 61.08
76.50 76.30 77.98 49.32
82.40 87.59 97.82 89.68
85.11 86.11 97.84 88.62
94.59 92.48 99.30 96.39
95.10 92.03 99.15 96.29
Table 10: Performance comparison using different architectures transfering from CIFAR-100.
ResNet50
C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
0 -5.71 8.75 15.50 15.00
1 -2.12 0.57 0.58 0.22
2 -0.11 0.80 0.02 0.03
ResNet18
C-10 F-MNIST MNIST SVHN
-7.61 7.10 16.63 11.76
-2.71 1.48 -0.02 1.06
-0.51 0.45 0.15 0.10
Table 11: Performance gap using different pretrained architectures transfering from CIFAR-100.
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Figure 10: Validation accuracy % during fine tuning of a network pretrained on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 11: Validation accuracy % during fine tuning of a network pretrained on CIFAR-100.
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Figure 12: Validation accuracy % during fine tuning of a network pretrained on Imagenet.
0 100 200 300
epoch
0
20
40
60
80
100
na
t_
pr
ec
1
mode = 0
0 100 200 300
epoch
mode = 1
0 100 200 300
epoch
mode = 2
dataset
aircraft
caltech-birds
cars
dogs
flowers
indoor
type
rob
st
Figure 13: Validation accuracy % during fine tuning of a network pretrained on ImageNet.
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Figure 14: Performance comparison in terms of accuracy % using different fine tuning modes. First
row: CIFAR-10 (left) CIFAR-100 (right); Second row: ImageNet.
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